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Abstract
We introduce sparse random projection, an important dimension-reduction tool from ma-
chine learning, for the estimation of discrete-choice models with high-dimensional choice
sets. Initially, the high-dimensional data are compressed into a lower-dimensional Eu-
clidean space using random projections. Subsequently, estimation proceeds using cyclic
monotonicity moment inequalities implied by the multinomial choice model; the estima-
tion procedure is semi-parametric and does not require explicit distributional assump-
tions to be made regarding the random utility errors. The random projection procedure
is justified via the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma: – the pairwise distances between data
points are preserved during data compression, which we exploit to show convergence of
our estimator. The estimator works well in a computational simulation and in a appli-
cation to a supermarket scanner dataset.
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1. Introduction
Estimation of discrete-choice models in which consumers face high-dimensional choice
sets is computationally challenging. In this paper, we propose a new estimator that is
tractable for semiparametric multinomial models with very large choice sets. Our estima-
tor utilizes random projection, a powerful dimensionality-reduction technique from the
machine learning literature. As far as we are aware, this is the first use of random projec-
tion in the econometrics literature on discrete-choice models. Using random projection,
we can feasibly estimate high-dimensional discrete-choice models without specifying par-
ticular distributions for the random utility errors – our approach is semi-parametric.
In random projection, vectors of high-dimensionality are replaced by random low-dimensional
linear combinations of the components in the original vectors. The Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Lemma, the backbone of random projection techniques, justifies that with high probabil-
ity, the high-dimensional vectors are embedded in a lower dimensional Euclidean space
in the sense that pairwise distances and inner products among the projected-down lower-
dimensional vectors are preserved.
Specifically, we are given a d-by-l data matrix, where d is the dimensionality of the choice
sets. When d is very large, we encounter computational problems that render estimation
difficult: estimating semiparametric discrete-choice models is already challenging, but
large choice sets exacerbate the computational challenges; moreover, in extreme cases,
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Sergio Montero, and participants at the DATALEAD conference (Paris, November 2015) for helpful
comments.
†INET & University of Southern California. E-mail: kchiong@usc.edu
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the choice sets may be so large that typical computers will not be able to hold the data
in memory (RAM) all at once for computation and manipulation.1
Using the idea of random projection, we propose first, in a data pre-processing step, pre-
multiplying the large d-by-l data matrix by a k-by-d (with k << d) stochastic matrix,
resulting in a smaller k-by-l compressed data matrix that is more manageable. Subse-
quenty, we estimate the discrete-choice model using the compressed data matrix, in place
of the original high-dimensional dataset. Specifically in the second step, we estimate the
discrete-choice model without needing to specify the distribution of the random utility
errors by using inequalities derived from cyclic monotonicity: – a generalization of the
notion of monotonicity for vector-valued functions which always holds for random-utility
discrete-choice models (Rockafellar (1970), Chiong et al. (2016)).
A desirable and practical feature of our procedure is that the random projection matrix
is sparse, so that generating and multiplying it with the large data matrix is easy. For
instance, when the dimensionality of the choice set is d = 5, 000, the random projection
matrix consists of roughly 99% zeros, and indeed only 1% of the data matrix is needed
or sampled.
We show theoretically that the random projection estimator converges to the unprojected
estimator, as k grows large. We utilize results from the machine learning literature, which
show that random projection enables embeddings of points from high-dimensional into
low-dimensional Euclidean space with high probability, and hence we can consistently
recover the original estimates from the compressed dataset. In the simulation, even
with small and moderate k, we show that the noise introduced by random projection is
reasonably small. In summary, k controls the trade-off between using a small/tractable
dataset for estimation, and error in estimation.
As an application of our procedures, we estimate a model of soft drink choice in which
households choose not only which soft drink product to purchase, but also the store that
they shop at. In the dataset, households can choose from over 3000 (store/soft drink
product) combinations, and we use random projection to reduce the number of choices
to 300, one-tenth of the original number.
1For example, Ng (2015) analyzes terabytes of scanner data that required an amount of RAM that
was beyond the budget of most researchers
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1.1. Related Literature
The difficulties with estimating multinomial choice models with very large choice sets
were already considered in the earliest econometric papers on discrete-choice models
(McFadden (1974, 1978)). There, within the special multinomial logit case, McFadden
discussed simulation approaches to estimation based on sampling the choices faced by
consumers; subsequently, this “sampled logit” model was implemented in Train et al.
(1987) (see also Davis et al. (2016)). This sampling approach depends crucially on
the multinomial logit assumption on the errors, and particularly on the independence
of the errors across items in the large choice set. Relatedly, Gentzkow et al. (2016)
use a Poisson approximation to enable parallel computing a multinomial logit model of
legislators’ choices among hundreds of thousands of phrases.
In contrast, the approach taken in this paper is semiparametric, as we avoid making spe-
cific parametric assumptions for the distribution of the errors. Our closest antecedent is
Fox (2007), who uses a maximum-score approach (cf. Manski (1975, 1985)) to estimate
semiparametric multinomial choice models with large choice sets but using only a subset
of the choices.2 Identification relies on a “rank-order” assumption, which is satisfied by
exchangeability of the joint error distribution (we discuss this in more detail below). The
rank-order property is an implication of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property, and hence can be considered as a generalized version of IIA. In contrast, our
cyclic monotonicity approach allows for non-exchangeable joint error distribution with
arbitrary correlation between the choice-specific error terms, but requires full indepen-
dence of errors with the observed covariates.3 Particularly, our approach accommodates
models with error structures in the generalized extreme value family (ie. nested logit
models), and we illustrate this in our empirical application below, where we consider a
model of joint store and brand choice in which a nested-logit (generalized extreme value)
model would typically be used.
2Fox and Bajari (2013) use this estimator for a model of the FCC spectrum auctions, and also
point out another reason whereby choice sets may be high-dimensionality: specifically, when choice sets
of consumers consist of bundles of products. The size of this combinatorial choice set is necessarily
exponentially increasing in the number of products. Even though the vectors of observed market shares
will be sparse, with many zeros, as long as a particular bundle does not have zero market share across
all markets, it will still contain identifying information.
3Besides Fox (2007), the literature on semiparametric multinomial choice models is quite small,
and includes the multiple-index approach of Ichimura and Lee (1991) and Lee (1995), and a pairwise-
differencing approach in Powell and Ruud (2008). These approaches do not appear to scale up easily
when choice sets are large, and also are not amenable to dimension-reduction using random projection.
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Indeed, Fox’s rank-order property and the cyclic monotonicity property used here rep-
resent two different (and non-nested) generalizations of Manski’s (1975) maximum-score
approach for semiparametric binary choice models to a multinomial setting. The rank-
order property restricts the dependence of the utility shocks across choices (exchange-
ability), while cyclic monotonicity restricts the dependence of the utility shocks across
different markets (or choice scenarios).4
The ideas of random projection were popularized in the Machine Learning literature
on dimensionality reduction (Achlioptas (2003); Dasgupta and Gupta (2003); Vempala
(2000)). As these papers point out both by mathematical derivations and computational
simulations, random projection allows computationally simple and low-distortion embed-
dings of points from high-dimensional into low-dimensional Euclidean space. However,
the random projection approach will not work with all high dimensional models. The
reason is that while the reduced-dimension vectors maintain the same length as the origi-
nal vectors, the individual components of these lower-dimension matrices may have little
relation to the components of the original vectors. Thus, models in which the components
of the vectors are important would not work with random projection.
However, in many high-dimensional econometric models only the lengths and inner prod-
ucts among the data vectors are important– this includes least-squares regression models
with a fixed number of regressors but a large number of observations and, as we will
see here, aggregate (market-level) multinomial choice models where consumers in each
market face a large number of choices. But it will not work in, for instance, least squares
regression models in which the number of observations are modest but the number of
regressors is large – such models call for regressor selection or reduction techniques, in-
cluding LASSO or principal components.5
Section 2 presents our semiparametric discrete-choice modeling framework, and the mo-
ment inequalities derived from cyclic monotonicity which we will use for estimation. In
section 3, we introduce random projection and show how it can be applied to the semi-
parametric discrete-choice context to overcome the computational difficulties with large
choice sets. We also show formally that the random-projection version of our estimator
4Haile et al. (2008) refer to this independence of the utility shocks across choice scenarios as an
“invariance” assumption, while Goeree et al. (2005) call the rank-order property a “monotonicity” or
“responsiveness” condition.
5See Belloni et al. (2012), Belloni et al. (2014), and Gillen et al. (2015). Both LASSO and principal
components do not maintain lengths and inner products of the data vectors; typically, they will result
in reduced-dimension vectors with length strictly smaller than the original vectors.
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converges to the full-sample estimator as the dimension of projection increases. Section
4 contains results from simulation examples, demonstrating the well-working of random
projection in practice, even when choice sets are only moderately large. In section 5, we
estimate a model of households’ joint decisions of store and brand choice, using store-level
scanner data. Section 6 concludes.
2. Modeling framework
We consider a semiparametric multinomial choice framework in which the choice-specific
utilities are assumed to take a single index form, but the distribution of utility shocks is
unspecified and treated as a nuisance element.6 Specifically, an agent chooses from among
C = [1, . . . , d] alternatives or choices. High-dimensionality here refers to a large value of d.
The utility that the agent derives from choice j is Xjβ+ j, where β = (β1, . . . , βb)
′ ∈ Rb
are unknown parameters, and Xj is a 1× b vector of covariates specific to choice j. Here,
j is a utility shock, encompassing unobservables which affect the agent’s utility from the
j-th choice.
Let uj ≡Xjβ denote the deterministic part of utility that the agent derives from choice
j, and let u = (uj)
d
j=1, which we assume to lie in the set U ⊆ Rd. For a given u ∈ U , the
probability that the agent chooses j is pj(u) = Pr(uj + j ≥ maxk 6=j{uk + k}). Denote
the vector of choice probabilities as p(u) = (pj(u))
d
j=1. Now observe that the choice
probabilities vector p is a vector-valued function such that p : U → Rd.
In this paper, we assume that the utility shocks  ≡ (1, . . . , d)′ are distributed in-
dependently of X ≡ (X1, . . . ,Xd), but otherwise allow it to follow an unknown joint
distribution that can be arbitrarily correlated among different choices j. This leads to
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let  be independent of X. Then the choice probability function p :
U → Rd satisfies cyclic monotonicity.
Definition 1 (Cyclic Monotonicity): Consider a function p : U → Rd, where U ⊆ Rd.
Take a length L-cycle of points in U , denoted as the sequence (u1,u2, . . . ,uL,u1). The
6 Virtually all the existing papers on semiparametric multinomial choices use similar setups (Fox
(2007), Ichimura and Lee (1991), Lee (1995), Powell and Ruud (2008)).
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function p is cyclic monotone with respect to the cycle (u1,u2, . . . ,uL,u1) if and only if
L∑
l=1
(ul+1 − ul) · p(ul) ≤ 0 (1)
where uL+1 = u1. The function p is cyclic monotone on U if and only if it is cyclic
monotone with respect to all possible cycles of all lengths on its domain (see Rockafellar
(1970)). 
Proposition 1 arises from underlying convexity properties of the discrete-choice problem.
We refer to Chiong et al. (2016) and Shi et al. (2016) for the full details. Briefly, the
independence of  and X implies that the social surplus function of the discrete choice
model, defined as,
G(u) = E
[
max
j∈{1,...,d}
(uj + j)
]
is convex in u. Subsequently, for each vector of utilities u ∈ U , the corresponding vector
of choice probabilities p(u), lies in the subgradient of G at u;7 that is:
p(u) ∈ ∂G(u). (2)
By a fundamental result in convex analysis (Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 23.5), the sub-
gradient of a convex function satisfies cyclic monotonicity, and hence satisfies the CM-
inequalities in (1) above. (In fact, any function that satisfies cyclic monotonicity must
be a subgradient of some convex function.) Therefore, cyclic monotonicity is the appro-
priate vector generalization of the fact that the slope of a scalar-valued convex function
is monotone increasing.
2.1. Inequalities for estimation
Following Shi et al. (2016), we use the cyclic monotonic inequalities in (1) to estimate the
parameters β.8 Suppose we observe the aggregate behavior of many independent agents
across n different markets.9 Our dataset consists of D = ((X(1),p(1)), . . . , (X(n),p(n))),
7See Theorem 1(i) in Chiong et al. (2016). This is the Williams-Daly-Zachary Theorem (cf. Mc-
Fadden (1981)), generalized to the case when the social surplus function may be non-differentiable,
corresponding to cases where the utility shocks  have bounded support or follow a discrete distribution.
8See also Melo et al. (2015) for an application of cyclic monotonicity for testing game-theoretic
models of stochastic choice.
9Throughout this paper, we assume the researcher has access to such aggregate data, in which the
market-level choice probabilities (or market shares) are directly observed. Such data structures arise
often in aggregate demand models in empirical industrial organization (eg. Berry and Haile (2014),
Gandhi et al. (2013)). We do not consider the application to individual-level choice data in this paper.
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p(i) denotes the d × 1 vector of choice probabilities, or market shares, in market i, and
X(i) is the d × b matrix of covariates for market i (where row j of X(i) corresponds
to X
(i)
j , the vector of covariates specific to choice j in market i). Assuming that the
distribution of the utility shock vectors
(
(1), . . . , (n)
)
is i.i.d. across all markets, then by
Proposition 1, the cyclic monotonicity inequalities (1) will be satisfied across all cycles
in the data D: that is,
L∑
l=1
(X(al+1)β −X(al)β) · p(al) ≤ 0, for all cycles (al)L+1l=1 in data D, L ≥ 2 (3)
Recall that a cycle in data D is a sequence of distinct integers (al)L+1l=1 , where aL+1 = a1,
and each integer is smaller than or equal n, the number of markets.
From the cyclic monotonicity inequalities in (3), we define a criterion function which we
will optimize to obtain an estimator of β. This criterion function is the sum of squared
violations of the cyclic monotonicity inequalities:
Q(β) =
∑
all cycles in data D;L≥2
[
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1)β −X(al)β) · p(al)]2
+
(4)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Our estimator is defined as
βˆ = argmin
β∈B:||β||=1
Q(β).
The parameter space B is defined to be a convex subset of Rb. The parameters are
normalized such that the vector βˆ has a Euclidean length of 1. This is a standard
normalization that is also used in the Maximum Rank Correlation estimator, for instance,
in Han (1987) and Hausman et al. (1998). Shi et al. (2016) shows that the criterion
function above delivers consistent interval estimates of the identified set of parameters
under the assumption that the covariates are exogenous. The criterion function here is
convex, and the global minimum can be found using subgradient descent (since it is not
differentiable everywhere).10
However for reasons discussed earlier, high-dimensional choice sets posed particular chal-
lenges for semi-parametric estimation. Next, we describe how random projection can
help reduce the dimensionality of our problem.
10Because the cyclic monotonicity inequalities involve differences in Xβ, no constant terms need be
included in the model, as it would simply difference out across markets. Similarly, any outside good
with mean utility normalized to zero would also drop out of the cyclic monotonicity inequalities.
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3. Random Projection
Our approach consists of two-steps: in the first data-preprocessing step, the data matrix
D is embedded into a lower-dimensional Euclidean space. This dimensionality reduction
is achieved by premultiplying D with a random projection matrix, resulting in a com-
pressed data matrix D˜ with a fewer number of rows, but the same number of columns
(that is, the number of markets and covariates is not reduced, but the dimensionality
of choice sets is reduced). In the second step, the estimator outlined in Equation (4) is
computed using only the compressed data D˜.
A random projection matrix R, is a k-by-d matrix (with k << d) such that each entry
Ri,j is distributed i.i.d according to
1√
k
F , where F is any mean zero distribution. For
any d-dimensional vectors u and v, premultiplication by R yields the random reduced-
dimensional (k × 1) vectors Ru and Rv; thus, Ru and Rv are the random projections
of u and v, respectively.
By construction, a random projection matrix R has the property that, given two high-
dimensional vectors u and v, the squared Euclidean distance between the two projected-
down vectors ‖Ru − Rv‖2 is a random variable with mean equal to ‖u − v‖2, the
squared distance between the two original high-dimensional vectors. Essentially, the
random projection procedure replaces each high-dimensional vector u with a random
lower-dimensional counterpart u˜ = Ru the length of which is a mean-preserving spread
of the original vector’s length.11
Most early applications of random projection utilized Gaussian random projection matri-
ces, in which each entry of R is generated independently from standard Gaussian (normal)
distributions. However, for computational convenience and simplicity, we focus in this
paper on sparse random projection matrices, in which many elements will be equal to
zero with high probability. Moreover, different choice of probability distributions of Ri,j
can lead to different variance and error tail bounds of ‖Ru− Rv‖2. Following the work
of Li et al. (2006), we introduce a class of sparse random projection matrices that can
also be tailored to enhance the efficiency of random projection.
Definition 2 (Sparse Random Projection Matrix): A sparse random projection matrix is
a k-by-d matrix R such that each i, j-th entry is independently and identically distributed
11For a detailed discussion, see chap. 1 in Vempala (2000).
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according to the following discrete distribution:
Ri,j =
√
s

+1 with probability 1
2s
0 with probability 1− 1
s
−1 with probability 1
2s
(s > 1).
By choosing a higher s, we produce sparser random projection matrices, but also increase
the variance of the projected-down vectors. Li et al. (2006) shows that:
Var(‖Ru−Rv‖2) = 1
k
(
2‖u− v‖4 + (s− 3)
d∑
j=1
(uj − vj)4
)
(5)
By using different values of s, we achieve a trade-off between having a sparser random
projection matrix, and one that is more efficient. For instance, if we let s = 1, we achieve
a dense random projection matrix, but we also achieve the lowest variance. We call this
the optimal random projection. If we let s = 3, we obtain a variance of 1
k
2‖u − v‖4,
which interestingly, is the same variance achieves by the benchmark Gaussian random
projection (each element of the random projection matrix is distributed i.i.d. according
to the standard Gaussian, see Achlioptas (2003)).
Since Gaussian random projection is dense and has the same efficiency as the sparse
random projection with s = 3, the class of random projections proposed in Definition
2 is to preferred in terms of both efficiency and sparsity. Moreover, random uniform
numbers are much easier to generate than Gaussian random numbers.
Moreover, Li et al. (2006) argues that in practice, we can use very sparse random pro-
jections with little loss in efficiency. In particular, the loss in efficiency for setting a very
large value of s (ultra-sparse random projection) vis-a`-vis a dense random projection
is neglible when d is large, which is precisely the setting where random projection is
desired. More concretely, we can set s to be as large as
√
d. We will see in the simula-
tion example that when d = 5, 000, setting s =
√
d implies that the random projection
matrix is zero with probability 0.986 – that is, only 1.4% of the data are sampled on
average. Yet we find that sparse random projection performs just as well as a dense
random projection.12
12More precisely, as shown by Li et al. (2006), is that if all fourth moments of the data to be projected-
down are finite, i.e. E[u4j ] < ∞, E[v4j ] < ∞, E[u2jv2j ] < ∞, for all j = 1, . . . , d, then the term ‖u − v‖4
in the variance formula (Eq. 5) dominates the second term (s− 3)∑dj=1(uj − vj)4 for large d (which is
precisely the setting we wish to use random projection).
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3.1. Random Projection Estimator
We introduce the random projection estimator. Given the dataset D = {(X(1),p(1)),
. . . , (X(n),p(n))}, define the compressed dataset by D˜k = {(X˜(1), p˜(1)), . . . , (X˜(n), p˜(n))},
where (X˜(i), p˜(i)) = (RX(i), Rp(i)) for all markets i, and R being a sparse k × d random
projection matrix as in Definition 2.
Definition 3 (Random projection estimator): The random projection estimator is de-
fined as β˜k ∈ argminβQ(β, D˜k), where Q(β, D˜k) is the criterion function in Equation (4)
in which the input data is D˜k. 
The compressed dataset D˜k has k number of rows, where the original dataset has a
larger number of rows, d. Note that the identities of the markets and covariates (i.e.
the columns of the data matrix) are unchanged in the reduced-dimension data matrix;
as a result, the same compressed dataset can be used to estimate different utility/model
specifications with varying combination of covariates and markets.
We will benchmark the random projection estimator with the estimator βˆ ∈ argminQ(β,D),
where Q(β,D) is the criterion function in Equation (4) in which the uncompressed data
D is used as input. In the next section, we will prove convergence of the random pro-
jection estimator to the benchmark estimator using uncompressed data, as k → ∞.
Here we provide some intuition and state some preliminary results for this convergence
result.
Recall in the previous section that the Euclidean distance between two vectors are pre-
served in expectation as these vectors are compressed into a lower-dimensional Euclidean
space. In order to exploit this feature of random projection for our estimator, we
rewrite the estimating inequalities – based on cyclic monotonicity – in terms of Euclidean
norms.
Definition 4 (Cyclic Monotonicity in terms of Euclidean norms): Consider a function
p : U → Rd, where U ⊆ Rd. Take a length L-cycle of points in U , denoted as the
sequence (u1,u2, . . . ,uL,u1). The function p is cyclic monotone with respect to the
cycle u1,u2, . . . ,uL,u1 if and only if
L+1∑
l=2
(‖ul − pl‖2 − ‖ul − pl−1‖2) ≤ 0 (6)
where uL+1 = u1. The function p is cyclic monotone on U if and only if it is cyclic
monotone with respect to all possible cycles of all lengths on its domain. 
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The inequalities 1 and 6 equivalently defined cyclic monotonicity (see Villani (2003)); a
proof is given in the appendix. Therefore, from Definition 4, we can rewrite the estimator
in (4) as βˆ = argminβ∈BQ(β) where the criterion function is defined as the sum of squared
violations of the cyclic monotonicity inequalities:
Q(β) =
∑
all cycles in data D;L≥2
[
L+1∑
m=2
(
‖X(al)β − p(al)‖2 − ‖X(al)β − p(al−1)‖2
)]2
+
(7)
To see the intuition behind the random projection estimator, we introduce the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss Lemma. This lemma states that there exists a linear map (which can be
found by drawing different random projection matrices) such that there is a low-distortion
embedding:
Lemma 1 (Johnson-Lindenstrauss). Let δ ∈ (0, 1
2
). Let U ⊂ Rd be a set of C points,
and k = 20 logC
δ2
. There exists a linear map f : Rd → Rk such that for all u,v ∈ U :
(1− δ)‖u− v‖2 ≤ ‖f(u)− f(v)‖2 ≤ (1 + δ)‖u− v‖2
Proofs of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma can be found in, among others, Dasgupta
and Gupta (2003), Vempala (2000). The proof is probabilistic, and demonstrates that,
with a non-zero probability, a random projection satisfies the error bounds stated in
the Lemma. For this reason, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma has become a term
that collectively represents random projection methods, although the implication of the
lemma is not directly used.
Remark 1: The feature that the cyclic monotonicity inequalities can be written in terms
of Euclidean norms between vectors justifies the application of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Lemma, and hence random projection, to our estimator, which is based on these inequal-
ities. In contrast, the “rank-order” inequalities, which underlie the maximum score ap-
proach to semiparametric multinomial choice estimation,13 cannot be rewritten in terms
in terms of Euclidean norms between data vectors, and hence random projection cannot
be used for those inequalities.
Remark 2: The derivation of our estimation approach for discrete-choice models does
not imply that all the choice probabilities be strictly positive – that is, zero choice
13eg. Manski (1985), Fox (2007). The rank-order property makes pairwise comparisons of choices
within a given choice set, and state that, for all i, j ∈ C, pi(u) > pj(u) iff ui > uj .
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probabilities are allowed for.14 The possibility of zero choice probabilities is especially
important and empirically relevant especially in a setting with large choice sets, as dataset
with large choice sets (such as store-level scanner data) often have zero choice probabilities
for many products (cf. Gandhi et al. (2013)).
3.2. Convergence
In this section we show that, for any given data D, the random projection estimator
computed using the compressed data D˜k = R · D converges in probability to the corre-
sponding estimator computed using the uncompressed data D, as k →∞, where k is the
number of rows in the random projection matrix R.
Therefore, k controls the trade-off between tractability and error in estimation.
These results do not depend on d, the dimension of the choice sets (which is also the
number of columns of R.) In order to highlight the random [projection aspect of our
estimator, we assume that the market shares and other data variables are assumed to be
observed without error. Hence, given the original (uncompressed) data D, the criterion
function Q(β,D) is deterministic, while the criterion function Q(β, D˜k) is random solely
due to the random projection procedure.
All proofs for results in this section are provided in Appendix C. We first show that
the random-projected criterion function converges uniformly to the unprojected criterion
function:
Theorem 1 (Uniform convergence of criterion function). For any given dataset D, we
have supβ∈B |Q(β, D˜k)−Q(β,D)| p−→ 0, as k grows.
Essentially, from the defining features of the random projection matrix R, we can argue
thatQ(β, D˜k) converges in probability toQ(β,D), pointwise in β. Then, becauseQ(β,D)
is convex in β (which we will also show), we can invoke the Convexity Lemma from
Pollard (1991), which says that pointwise and uniform convergence are equivalent for
convex random functions.
Finally, under the assumption that the deterministic criterion function Q(β,D) (i.e. com-
puted without random projection) admits an identified set, then the random projection
estimator converges in a set-wise sense to the same identified set. Convergence of the
set estimator here means convergence in the Hausdorff distance, where the Hausdorff
14Specifically, Eq. (2) allows some of the components of the choice probability vector p(u) to be zero.
12
distance is a distance measure between two sets is: d(X, Y ) = supy∈Y infx∈X ‖x − y‖ +
supx∈X infy∈Y ‖x− y‖.
Assumption 1 (Existence of identified set Θ∗). For any given data D, we assume that
there exists a set Θ∗ (that depends on D) such that supβ∈Θ∗ Q(β,D) = infβ∈Θ∗ Q(β,D)
and ∀ν > 0, infβ/∈B(Θ∗,ν) Q(β,D) > supβ∈Θ∗ Q(β,D), where B(Θ∗, ν) denotes a union of
open balls of radius ν each centered on each element of Θ∗.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 hold. For any given data D, the random pro-
jection estimator Θ˜k = argminβ∈BQ(β, D˜k) converges in half-Hausdorff distance to the
identified set Θ∗ as k grows, i.e. supβ∈Θ˜k infβ′∈Θ∗ ‖β − β′‖
p−→ 0 as k grows.
4. Simulation examples
In this section, we show simulation evidence that random projection performs well in
practice. In these simulations, the sole source of randomness is the random projection
matrices. This allows us to starkly examine the noise introduced by random projections,
and how the performance of random projections varies as we change k, the reduced
dimensionality. Therefore the market shares and other data variables are assumed to be
observed without error.
The main conclusion from this section is that the error introduced by random projection
is negligible, even when the reduced dimension k is very small. In the tables below,
we see that the random projection method produces interval estimates that are always
strictly nested within the identified set which was obtained when the full uncompressed
data are used.
4.1. Setup
We consider projecting down from d to k. Recall that d is the number of choices in our
context. There are n = 30 markets. The utility that an agent in market m receives
from choice j is U
(m)
j = β1X
(m)
1,j + β2X
(m)
2,j , where X
(m)
1,j ∼ N(1, 1) and X(m)2,j ∼ N(−1, 1)
independently across all choices j and markets m.15
15We also considered two other sampling assumptions on the regressors, and found that the results
are robust to: (i) strong brand effects: X
(m)
l,j = Xl,j + η
(m)
l,j , l = 1, 2, where X1,j ∼ N(1, 0.5), X2,j ∼
N(−1, 0.5), and η(m)l,j ∼ N(0, 1); (ii) strong market effects: X(m)l,j = X(m)l + η(m)l,j , l = 1, 2, where
X
(m)
1 ∼ N(1, 0.5), X(m)2 ∼ N(−1, 0.5), and η(m)l,j ∼ N(0, 1).
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We normalize the parameters β = (β1, β2) such that ‖β‖ = 1. This is achieved by
parameterizing β using polar coordinates: β1 = cos θ and β2 = sin θ, where θ ∈ [0, 2pi].
The true parameter is θ0 = 0.75pi = 2.3562.
To highlight a distinct advantage of our approach, we choose a distribution of the error
term that is neither exchangeable nor belongs to the generalized extreme value family.
Specifically, we let the additive error term be a MA(2) distribution where errors are serial
correlated in errors across products. To summarize, the utility that agent in market m
derives from choice j is U
(m)
j + 
(m)
j , where 
(m)
j =
1
3
∑3
l=0 η
(m)
j+l , and η
(m)
j is distributed
i.i.d with N(0, 1).
Using the above specification, we generate the data D = {(X(1),p(1)), . . . , (X(n),p(n))}
for n = 30 markets, where p(m) corresponds to the d-by-1 vector of simulated choice prob-
abilities for market m: the j-th row of p(m) is p
(m)
j = Pr
(
U
(m)
j + 
(m)
j > U
(m)
−j + 
(m)
−j
)
. We
then perform random projection onD to obtain the compressed dataset D˜ = {(X˜(1), p˜(1)), . . . , (X˜(n), p˜(n))}.
More specifically, where for all markets m, (X˜(m), p˜(m)) = (RX(i), Rp(i)), where R is a
realized k× d random projection matrix as in Definition 2. Having constructed the com-
pressed dataset, the criterion function in Eq. 4 is used to estimate β. We restrict to
cycles of length 2 and 3 in computing Eq. 4; however, we find that even using cycles of
length 2 did not change the result in any noticeable way.
The random projection matrix is parameterized by s (see Definition 2). We set s = 1,
which corresponds to the optimal random projection matrix. In Table 2, we show that
sparse random projections (s =
√
d in Definition 2) perform just as well. Sparse random
projections are much faster to perform – for instance when d = 5000, we sample less than
2% of the data, as over 98% of the random projection matrix are zeros.
In these tables, the rows correspond to different designs where the dimension of the
dataset is projected down from d to k. For each design, we estimate the model using 100
independent realizations of the random projection matrix. We report the means of the
upper and lower bounds of the estimates, as well as their standard deviations. We also
report the interval spans by the 25th percentile of the lower bounds as well as the 75th
percentile of the upper bounds. The last column reports the actual identified set that
is computed without using random projections. (In the Appendix, Tables 5 and 6, we
see that in all the runs, our approach produces interval estimates that are always strictly
nested within the identified sets.)
The results indicate that, in most cases, optimization of the randomly-projected criterion
function Q(β,Dk) yields a unique minimum, in contrast to the unprojected criterion
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function Q(β,D), which is minimized at an interval. For instance, in the fourth row of
Table 1 (when compressing from d = 5000 to k = 100), we see that the true identified set
for this specification, computed using the unprojected data, is [1.2038, 3.5914], but the
projected criterion function is always uniquely minimized (across all 100 replications).
Moreover the average point estimate for θ is equal to 2.3766, where the true value is
2.3562. This is unsurprising, and occurs often in the moment inequality literature; the
random projection procedure introduces noise into the projected inequalities so that,
apparently, there are no values of the parameters β which jointly satisfy all the projected
inequalities, leading to a unique minimizer for the projected criterion function.
Table 1: Random projection estimator with optimal random projections, s = 1
Design mean LB (s.d.) mean UB (s.d.) 25th LB, 75th UB True id set
d = 100, k = 10 2.3459 (0.2417) 2.3459 (0.2417) [2.1777, 2.5076] [1.4237, 3.2144]
d = 500, k = 100 2.2701 (0.2582) 2.3714 (0.2832) [2.1306, 2.6018] [1.2352, 3.4343]
d = 1000, k = 100 2.4001 (0.2824) 2.4001 (0.2824) [2.2248, 2.6018] [1.1410, 3.4972]
d = 5000, k = 100 2.3766 (0.3054) 2.3766 (0.3054) [2.1306, 2.6018] [1.2038, 3.5914]
d = 5000, k = 500 2.2262 (0.3295) 2.4906 (0.3439) [1.9892, 2.7667] [1.2038, 3.5914]
Replicated 100 times using independently realized random projection matrices. The true
value of θ is 2.3562. Right-most column reports the interval of points that minimized the
unprojected criterion function.
Table 2: Random projection estimator with sparse random projections, s =
√
d
Design mean LB (s.d.) mean UB (s.d.) 25th LB, 75th UB True id set
d = 100, k = 10 2.3073 (0.2785) 2.3073 (0.2785) [2.1306, 2.5076] [1.4237, 3.2144]
d = 500, k = 100 2.2545 (0.2457) 2.3473 (0.2415) [2.0363, 2.5076] [1.2352, 3.4343]
d = 1000, k = 100 2.3332 (0.2530) 2.3398 (0.2574) [2.1777, 2.5076] [1.1410, 3.4972]
d = 5000, k = 100 2.3671 (0.3144) 2.3671 (0.3144) [2.1777, 2.5547] [1.2038, 3.5914]
d = 5000, k = 500 2.3228 (0.3353) 2.5335 (0.3119) [2.1306, 2.7667] [1.2038, 3.5914]
Replicated 100 times using independently realized sparse random projection matrices (where
s =
√
d in Definition 2). The true value of θ is 2.3562. Right-most column reports the interval
of points that minimized the unprojected criterion function.
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5. Empirical Application: a discrete-choice model incorporating both store
and brand choices
For our empirical application, we use supermarket scanner data made available by the
Chicago-area Dominicks supermarket chain.16 Dominick’s operated a chain of grocery
stores across the Chicago area, and the database recorded sales information on many
product categories, at the store and week level, at each Dominick’s store. For this
application, we look at the soft drinks category.
For our choice model, we consider a model in which consumers choose both the type of
soft drink, as well as the store at which they make their purchase. Such a model of joint
store and brand choice allows consumers not only to change their brand choices, but
also their store choices, in response to across-time variation in economic conditions. For
instance, Coibion et al. (2015) is an analysis of supermarket scanner data which suggests
the importance of “store-switching” in dampening the effects of inflation in posted store
prices during recessions.
Such a model of store and brand choice also highlights a key benefit of our semiparametric
approach. A typical parametric model which would be used to model store and brand
choice would be a nested logit model, in which the available brands and stores would
belong to different tiers of nesting structure. However, one issue with the nested logit
approach is that the results may not be robust, and sensitive to different researchers’
specific assumption on the nesting structure– for instance, one researcher may nest brands
below stores, while another researcher may be inclined to nest stores below brands. These
two alternative specifications would differ in how the joint distribution of the utility
shocks between brands at different stores are modeled, leading to different parameter
estimates. Typically, there are no a priori guides on the correct nesting structure to
impose.17
In this context, a benefit of our semiparametric is that we are agnostic as to the joint
distribution of utility shocks; hence our approach accommodate both models in which
stores are in the upper nest and brands in the lower nest, or vice versa, or any other
model in which the stores or brands could be divided into further sub-nests.
We have n = 15 “markets”, where each market corresponds to a distinct two-weeks
16This dataset has previously been used in many papers in both economics and marketing; see a
partial list at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/kilts/marketing-databases/dominicks/papers.
17Because of this, Hausman and McFadden (1984) have developed formal econometric specification
tests for the nested logit model.
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Figure 1: Location of the 11 Dominick’s branches as indicated by spots.
Radius of the circle is 4 miles. The darker spots are Dominick’s medium-tier stores, the rest are
high-tiers.
interval between October 3rd 1996 to April 30th 1997, which is the last recorded date. We
include sales at eleven Dominicks supermarkets in north-central Chicago, as illustrated in
Figure 1. Among these eleven supermarkets, most are classified as premium-tier stores,
while two are medium-tier stores (distinguished by dark black spots in Figure 1); stores
in different tiers sell different ranges of products.
Our store and brand choice model consists of d = 3059 choices, each corresponds to a
unique store and UPC combination. We also define an outside option, for a total of
d = 3060 choices.19The summary statistics for our data sample are in Table 3.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. As in the simulation results above, we ran 100
independent random projections, and thus obtained 100 sets of parameter estimates, for
each model specification. The results reported in Table 4 are therefore summary statistics
of the estimates for each parameter. Since no location normalization is imposed for the
error terms, we do not include constants in any of the specifications. For estimation, we
used cycles of length of length 2 and 3.20
18Stores in the same tier share similar product selection, and also pricing to a certain extent.
19The outside option is constructed as follows: first we construct the market share pij as pij =
quantityij/custcouni, where quantityij is the total units of store-upc j sold in market i, and custcouni
is the total number of customers visiting the 11 stores and purchasing something at market i. The
market share for market i’s outside option is then 1−∑3093j=1 pij .
20The result did not change in any noticeable when we vary the length of the cycles used in estimation.
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Definition Summary statistics
priceij
The average price of the store-upc j at
market i
Mean: $2.09, s.d: $1.77
bonusij
The fraction of weeks in market i for which
store-upc j was on sale as a bonus or
promotional purchase; for instance
“buy-one-get-one-half-off” deals
Mean: 0.27, s.d: 0.58
quantityij total units of store-upc j sold in market i Mean: 60.82, s.d: 188.37
holidayij
A dummy variable indicating the period
spanning 11/14/96 to 12/25/96, which
includes the Thanksgiving and Christmas
holidays
6 weeks (3 markets)
medium tierij Medium, non-premium stores.18 2 out of 11 stores
d Number of store-upc 3059
Table 3: Summary statistics
Total number of observations is 45885, i.e. number of store-upc=3059 times number of markets
(two-week periods)=15.
Across all specifications, the price coefficient is strongly negative. The holiday indica-
tor has a positive (but small) coefficient, suggesting that, all else equal, the end-of-year
holidays are a period of peak demand for soft drink products.21 In addition, the in-
teraction between price and holiday is strongly negative across specifications, indicating
that households are more price-sensitive during the holiday season. For the magnitude
of this effect, consider a soft drink product priced initially at $1.00 with no promotion.
The median parameter estimates for Specification (C) suggest that during the holiday
period, households’ willingness-to-pay for this product falls as much as if the price for
the product increases by $0.27 during non-holiday periods.22
We also obtain a positive sign on bonus, and the negative sign on the interaction price
× bonus across all specifications, although their magnitudes are small, and there is more
variability in these parameters across the different random projections. We see that
discounts seem to make consumers more price sensitive (ie. make the price coefficient
21cf. Chevalier et al. (2003).
22−0.77α = 0.0661− (0.77 + 0.36)α(1 + 0.27), where α = −0.1161 equals a scaling factor we used to
scale the price data so that the price vector has the same length as the bonus vector. (The rescaling of
data vectors is without loss of generality, and improves the performance of random projection by Eq.
(5).)
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Specification (A) (B) (C) (D)
price −0.6982 −0.9509 −0.7729 −0.4440
[−0.9420,−0.3131] [−0.9869,−0.7874] [−0.9429,−0.4966] [−0.6821,−0.2445]
bonus 0.0580 0.0461 0.0336
[−0.0116, 0.1949] [0.0054, 0.1372] [0.0008, 0.0733]
price × bonus −0.1447 −0.0904 −0.0633
[−0.4843, 0.1123] [−0.3164, 0.0521] [−0.1816, 0.0375]
holiday 0.0901 0.0661 0.0238
[−0.0080, 0.2175] [−0.0288, 0.1378] [−0.0111, 0.0765]
price × holiday −0.6144 −0.3609 −0.1183
[−0.9013,−0.1027] [−0.7048,−0.0139] [−0.2368,−0.0164]
price × medium tier 0.4815
[−0.6978, 0.8067]
k = 300
Cycles of length 2 & 3
Table 4: Random projection estimates, dimensionality reduction from d = 3059 to k =
300.
First row in each entry present the median coefficient, across 100 random projections. Second row
presents the 25-th and 75-th percentile among the 100 random projections. We use cycles of length 2
and 3 in computing the criterion function (Eq. 4).
more negative). Since any price discounts will be captured in the price variable itself,
the bonus coefficients capture additional effects that the availability of discounts has on
behavior, beyond price. Hence, the negative coefficient on the interaction price × bonus
may be consistent with a bounded-rationality view of consumer behavior, whereby the
availability of discount on a brand draws consumers’ attention to its price, making them
more aware of a product’s exact price once they are aware that it is on sale.
In specification (D), we introduce the store-level covariate medium-tier, interacted with
price. However, the estimates of its coefficient are noisy, and vary widely across the 100
random projections. This is not surprising, as medium-tier is a time-invariant variable
and, apparently here, interacting it with price still does not result in enough variation
for reliable estimation.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we consider the use of random projection – an important tool for dimension-
reduction from machine learning – for estimating multinomial-choice models with large
choice sets, a model which arises in many empirical applications. Unlike many recent ap-
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plications of machine learning in econometrics, dimension-reduction here is not required
for selecting amongst high-dimensional covariates, but rather for reducing the inherent
high-dimensionality of the model (ie. reducing the size of agents’ choice sets).
Our estimation procedure takes two steps. First, the high-dimensional choice data are
projected (embedded stochastically) into a lower-dimensional Euclidean space. This pro-
cedure is justified via results in machine learning, which shows that the pairwise distances
between data points are preserved during data compression. As we show, in practice the
random projection can be very sparse, in the sense that only a small fraction (1%) of the
dataset is used in constructing the projection. In the second step, estimation proceeds
using the cyclic monotonicity inequalities implied by the multinomial choice model. By
using these inequalities for estimation, we avoid making explicit distributional assump-
tions regarding the random utility errors; hence, our estimator is semi-parametric. The
estimator works well in computational simulations and in an application to a real-world
supermarket scanner dataset.
We are currently considering several extensions. First, we are undertaking another empir-
ical application in which consumers can choose among bundles of brands, which would
thoroughly leverage the benefits of our random projection approach. Second, another
benefit of random projection is that it preserves privacy, in that the researcher no longer
needs to handle the original dataset but rather a “jumbled-up” random version of it.23
We are currently exploring additional applications of random projection for econometric
settings in which privacy may be an issue.
23cf. Heffetz and Ligett (2014).
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Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures
Design min LB, max UB True id set
d = 100, k = 10 [1.8007, 3.3087] [1.4237, 3.2144]
d = 500, k = 100 [1.7536, 2.9317] [1.2352, 3.4343]
d = 1000, k = 100 [1.6593, 2.9317] [1.1410, 3.4972]
d = 5000, k = 100 [1.6593, 3.1202] [1.2038, 3.5914]
d = 5000, k = 500 [1.6593, 3.1202] [1.2038, 3.5914]
Table 5: Random projection estimator with optimal random projections, s = 1. Replicated 100
times using independently realized random projection matrices. The true value of θ is 2.3562.
Identified set is the interval of points that minimized the unprojected criterion function.
Design min LB, max UB True id set
d = 100, k = 10 [1.4237, 2.9788] [1.4237, 3.2144]
d = 500, k = 100 [1.7536, 2.9788] [1.2352, 3.4343]
d = 1000, k = 100 [1.6122, 3.0259] [1.1410, 3.4972]
d = 5000, k = 100 [1.4237, 3.3558] [1.2038, 3.5914]
d = 5000, k = 500 [1.6593, 3.0259] [1.2038, 3.5914]
Table 6: Random projection estimator with sparse random projections, s =
√
d. Replicated
100 times using independently realized sparse random projection matrices (where s =
√
d in
Definition 2). The true value of θ is 2.3562. Identified set is the interval of points that minimized
the unprojected criterion function.
Appendix B Equivalence of alternative
representation of cyclic monotonicity
Here we show the equivalence of Eqs. (1) and (6), as two alternative statements of the cyclic
monotonicity inequalities. We begin with the second statement (6). We have
L+1∑
l=2
‖ul − pl‖2 =
L+1∑
l=2
d∑
j=1
(
ulj − plj
)2
=
L+1∑
l=2
 d∑
j=1
(ulj)
2 +
d∑
j=1
(plj)
2 − 2
d∑
j=1
uljp
l
j
 .
Similarly
L+1∑
l=2
‖ul − pl−1‖2 =
L+1∑
l=2
d∑
j=1
(
ulj − pl−1j
)2
=
L+1∑
l=2
 d∑
j=1
(ulj)
2 +
d∑
j=1
(pl−1j )
2 − 2
d∑
j=1
uljp
l−1
j
 .
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In the previous two displayed equations, the first two terms cancel out. By shifting the l indices
forward we have:
L+1∑
l=2
d∑
j=1
uljp
l−1
j =
L∑
l=1
d∑
j=1
ul+1j p
l
j .
Moreover, by definition of a cycle that uL+1j = u
1
j , p
L+1
j = p
1
j , we then have:
L+1∑
l=2
d∑
j=1
uljp
l
j =
L∑
l=1
d∑
j=1
uljp
l
j
Hence
L+1∑
l=2
(
‖ul − pl‖2 − ‖ul − pl−1‖2
)
= 2
L∑
l=1
d∑
j=1
(
uljp
l−1
j − uljplj
)
= 2
L∑
l=1
(ul+1 − ul) · pl
Therefore, cyclic monotonicity of Eq. (1) is satisfied if and only if this formulation of cyclic
monotonicity in terms of Euclidean norms is satisfied.
Appendix C Proof of Theorems in Section 3.2
We first introduce two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Convexity Lemma, Pollard (1991)). Suppose An(s) is a sequence of convex random
functions defined on an open convex set S in Rd, which converges in probability to some A(s),
for each s. Then sups∈K |An(s)− A(s)| goes to zero in probability, for each compact subset K
of S.
Lemma 3. The criterion function Q(β,D) is convex in β ∈ B for any given dataset D, where
B is an open convex subset of Rb.
Proof. We want to show that Q(λβ+ (1−λ)β′) ≤ λQ(β) + (1−λ)Q(β′), where λ ∈ [0, 1], and
we suppress the dependence of Q on the data D.
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Q(λβ + (1− λ)β′)
=
∑
all cycles in data D
[
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
) (
λβ + (1− λ)β′) · p(al)]2
+
=
∑
all cycles in data D
[
λ
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
)
β · p(al) + (1− λ)
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
)
β′ · p(al)
]2
+
≤
∑
all cycles in data D
{
λ
[
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
)
β · p(al)
]
+
+ (1− λ)
[
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
)
β′ · p(al)
]
+
}2
(8)
≤λ
∑
all cycles in data D
[
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
)
β · p(al)
]2
+
+
(1− λ)
∑
all cycles in data D
[
L∑
l=1
(
X(al+1) −X(al)
)
β′ · p(al)
]2
+
(9)
=λQ(β) + (1− λ)Q(β′)
Inequality 8 above is due to the fact that max{x, 0}+max{y, 0} ≥ max{x+y, 0} for all x, y ∈ R.
Inequality 9 holds from the convexity of the function f(x) = x2.
Proof of Theorem 1: Recall from Eq. (5) that for any two vectors u,v ∈ Rd, and for the
class of k-by-d random projection matrices, R, considered in Definition 2, we have:
E(‖Ru−Rv‖2) = ‖u− v‖2 (10)
Var(‖Ru−Rv‖2) = O
(
1
k
)
(11)
Therefore by Chebyshev’s inequality, ‖Ru − Rv‖2 converges in probability to ‖u − v‖2 as
k → ∞. It follows that for any given X, β and p, we have ‖X˜β − p˜‖2 →p ‖Xβ − p‖2,
where X˜ = RX and p˜ = Rp are the projected versions of X and p. Applying the Continuous
Mapping Theorem to the criterion function in Eq. 7, we obtain that Q(β, D˜k) converges in
probability to Q(β,D) pointwise for every β as k →∞.
By Lemma 3, the criterion function Q(β,D) is convex in β ∈ B for any given data D, where B
is an open convex subset of Rb. Therefore, we can immediately invoke the Convexity Lemma to
show that pointwise convergence of the Q function implies that Q(β, D˜k) converges uniformly
to Q(β,D). 
Proof of Theorem 2: The result follows readily from Assumption 1 and Theorem 1, by
invoking Chernozhukov et al. (2007). The key is in recognizing that (i) in our random finite-
sampled criterion function, the randomness stems from the k-by-d random projection matrix,
26
(ii) the deterministic limiting criterion function here is defined to be the criterion function
computed without random projection, taking the full dataset as given. We can then strengthen
the notion of half-Hausdorff convergence to full Hausdorff convergence following the augmented
set estimator as in Chernozhukov et al. (2007). 
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